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Abstract
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with lim-
ited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption
that the payo® set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game
with limited side payments has a nonempty "-core. Our main result is that,
when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-e®ective small groups is
assumed, then all payo®s in the "-core treat similar players similarly. A bound
on the distance between "-core payo®s of any two similar players is given in
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terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the liter-
ature showing that games with many players and small e®ective groups have
the properties of competitive markets.
1 Introduction.
In many game theoretic and economic situations side payments may be freely made
only within small groups of players. For example, marriage games may permit some
side-paymentness between matched pairs of players but may rule out side payments
between marriages. Even if side payments were possible it may require cooperation
and agreement among a large numbers of players to make large transfers of payo® and
such agreements may be di±cult to obtain.1 In this paper we introduce the concept of
games with limited side payments and demonstrate conditions under which "-cores are
nonempty and all payo®s in the "-core of a game treat similar players nearly equally.
The "-core consists of those feasible payo®s that cannot be improved upon by any
coalition by at least " for each member of the coalition. Side payments are limited in
the sense that coalitions bounded in size are e®ective for achievement of almost all
gains to increasing coalition size and large transfers of payo® are ruled out. We show
that games with limited side payments and convex total payo® sets have nonempty
"-cores, where for games with many players, " can be chosen to be small. Our
main result is that any "-core payo® has approximately the equal-treatment property;
that is, all players who are substitutes or approximate substitutes are treated nearly
equally.
Our interest in approximate cores stems from our interest in competition in di-
verse economic settings, such as those with local public goods, clubs, production,
location, indivisibilities, non-monotonicities, and other deviations from the classic
Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model. Both of our results contribute to a line of research
investigating the \market-like" properties of large games under conditions limiting
returns to group size, cf. Wooders (1983,1994b). An important precursor is Shap-
ley and Shubik (1966), which shows that large exchange economies have non-empty
approximate cores; another is Shapley and Shubik (1969), which demonstrates an
equivalence between markets and totally balanced games. From an economic per-
spective, the remarkable paper of Tiebout (1956), in which he conjectured that large
economies with local public goods were \market-like," contains insights similar to
those that lead to the current research.2
In large games, the core is a \stand-in" for the competitive equilibrium.3 Thus,
1This point is stressed in Kaneko and Wooders (1997).
2See Wooders (1997) and references therein.
3See, for example, see Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Wooders (1994a,b) for market-games with
side payments. Also relevant are Billera (1974) and Mas-Colell (1975). Hildenbrand and Kirman
(1988, Chapter 4), among others, treat the core more explicitly as the stand in for the competitive
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a crucial result is that in large games cores or approximate cores are nonempty.
Since the competitive equilibrium has the equal-treatment property, for games to
approximate competitive markets it is also crucial that approximate cores converge
to equal-treatment payo®s. Our result showing that "-cores treat similar players
similarly demonstrates that the equal treatment property of competitive equilibrium
extends to approximate cores of large games with small e®ective groups and limited
side payments.
Our results apply to parameterized collections of games. The parameters de-
scribing the games are: (a) a bound on the number of approximate player types and
the accuracy of the approximation and (b) a bound on the size of nearly e®ective
groups of players and their distance from exact e®ectiveness. Two players are ap-
proximately the same types if they make similar contributions to coalitions; that is,
they are approximate substitutes. That nearly-e®ective groups are bounded in size
means that all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by coalitions
no larger than the bound. This can be viewed as a sort of \small group e®ectiveness"
assumption.
To place our research in the context of the literature, we remark that prior to the
introduction of parameterized collections of games, other papers showing nonempti-
ness of approximate cores of large games relied on the construct of a pregame.4 Recall
that a pregame consists of a set of player types and a single worth function assigning
a payo® to any group of players. The payo® to a group of players depends on the num-
bers of players of each type in the group. Given a total player set and a speci¯cation
of the numbers of players of each type in the set, the worth function of the pregame
induces a worth function on the player set and thus determines a game. The pregame
structure, which requires that all games considered are subgames of some larger game,
has hidden consequences. To illustrate, in the pregame framework, when there are
su±ciently many players of each type that appears in the games, the assumptions of
small group e®ectiveness and per capita boundedness are equivalent (Wooders 1994b,
Section 5); this does not hold for parameterized collections of games. In addition, the
pregame framework dictates that the payo® to a group is independent of the player
set in which it's embedded; thus, widespread externalities are ruled out.
Results in the literature on convergence of approximate cores to equal-treatment
payo®s have also relied on the pregame structure. In the context of a pregame with
side payments, when there are many close substitutes for each player, under the mild
condition of per capita boundedness of average payo®, "-cores of large games with side
payments are nonempty and approximately equal-treatment in the sense that most
players of the same type receive nearly the same payo®s (Wooders 1980,1994a)5. In
equilibrium in non-classical exchange economies.
4See, for example, Wooders (1983,1994a,b) and Wooders and Zame (1984).
5See also Shubik and Wooders (1982), who apply the game-theoretic results of Wooders (1980)
to economies with clubs and multiple memberships and provide a discussion of related literature.
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large games with strictly e®ective small groups { that is, all gains to cooperation can
be realized by groups bounded in size { and with strongly comprehensive payo® sets,
all payo®s in the core have the equal treatment property (Wooders 1983, Theorem
3).
Since the games we consider in the current paper have limited side payments we
are able to obtain a result close to Wooders' (1983) result for games with strictly
e®ective small groups. Thus, our equal-treatment result is stronger than prior results
in three important ways: First, although it is not required that small groups are
strictly e®ective, we demonstrate that all players of the same approximate type are
treated approximately equally. Second, when there are su±ciently many players of
an approximate type, our result provides an explicit bound on the distance between
the "-core payo®s for any two players of that approximate type. Third, our results are
not restricted to games with transferable utility nor to games derived from pregames.
In the next section we introduce required de¯nitions. Section 3 states our nonempti-
ness result and provides a number of examples. Section 4 introduces games with
\side-paymentness" uniformly bounded away from zero only for nearly-e®ective small
groups, states our result that the "-core is approximately equal-treatment, and pro-
vides additional examples. Section 5 provides some remarks on our model and results
and relates our work to prior literature. Section 6 discusses related economies with
limited side payments. Proofs are collected in Section 7 and two additional examples
appear in an appendix.
2 De¯nitions.
2.1 Cooperative games: description and notations.
Let N = f1; ::; ng denote a set of players. A nonempty subset of N is called a
coalition. For any coalition S let RS denote the jSj-dimensional Euclidean space
with coordinates indexed by elements of S. For x 2 RN ; xS will denote its restriction
to RS. To order vectors in RS we use the symbols >>; > and ¸ with their usual
interpretations. The nonnegative orthant of RS is denoted by RS+ and the strictly
positive orthant by RS++. For A ½ RS; co(A) denotes the convex hull of A. We
denote by ~1S the vector of ones in RS, that is, ~1S = (1; :::; 1) 2 RS. Each coalition S
has a feasible set of payo®s or utilities denoted by VS ½ RS. By agreement V; = f0g
and Vfig is nonempty, closed and bounded from above for any i. Moreover we will
The results of Wooders (1980) should not be confused with other results published the same year in
Econometrica, dealing with local public good (or club) economies with anonymous crowding. In that
context, coalitions can be restricted to consist of identical individuals and the core will be unchanged;
game-theoretically this is a very special case. In contrast, Wooders (1980), referenced herein, treats
the general case of pregames with a ¯nite number of types and requires only boundedness of per
capita payo®s.
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assume that
(¤) maxnx : x 2 Vfigo = 0 for any i 2 N:
It must be noted that (¤) is by no means restrictive since it can always be achieved
by a normalization. It is convenient to describe the feasible utilities of a coalition as
a subset of RN . For each coalition S let
V (S) :=
n
x 2 RN : xS 2 VS and xa = 0 for a =2 S
o
:
A game without side payments (called also an NTU game or simply a game)
is a pair (N; V ) where the correspondence V : 2N ¡! RN is such that V (S) ½n
x 2 RN : xa = 0 for a =2 S
o
for any S ½ N and satis¯es the following properties :
(2.1) V (S) is non-empty and closed for all S ½ N .
(2.2) V (S) \ RN+ is bounded for all S ½ N , in the sense that there is real number
K > 0 such that if x 2 V (S) \RN+ then xi · K for all i 2 S.
(2.3) V (S1
S
S2) ¾ V (S1) + V (S2) for any disjoint S1; S2 ½ N (superadditivity).
(2.4) V (S) = V (S)¡nx 2 RN+ : xa = 0 for a =2 So for all S ½ N (comprehensiveness).
2.2 Games with limited side payments.
To de¯ne parameterized collections of games we will need the concept of Hausdor®
distance. For every two nonempty subsets E and F of a metric space (M; d) de¯ne
the Hausdor® distance between E and F dist(E;F ) (with respect to the metric d on
M) by
dist(E;F ) := inf f" 2 (0;1) : E ½ B"(F ) and F ½ B"(E)g ;
where B"(E) := fx 2M : d(x;E) · "g denotes the "-neighborhood of E.
Since payo® sets are unbounded below, we will use a modi¯cation of the concept
of the Hausdor® distance so that the distance between two payo® sets is the distance
between the intersection of the sets and a subset of Euclidean space. Let m¤ be a
¯xed positive real number. Let M¤ be a subset of Euclidean space RN de¯ned by
M¤ :=
n
x 2 RN : xa ¸ ¡m¤ for any a 2 N
o
. For every two non-empty subsets E
and F of Euclidean space RN let H1[E;F ] denote the Hausdor® distance between
E\M¤ and F\M¤ with respect to the metric kx¡ yk1 := maxi jxi ¡ yij on Euclidean
space RN .
The concepts de¯ned below lead to the de¯nition of parameterized collections
of games. To motivate the concepts, each is related to analogous concepts in the
pregame framework.
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±¡substitute partitions: In our approach we approximate games with many players,
all of whom may be distinct, by games with ¯nite sets of player types. Observe that
for a compact metric space of player types, given any real number ± > 0 there is a
partition (not necessarily unique) of the space of player types into a ¯nite number
of subsets, each containing players who are \±-similar" to each other. Parameterized
collections of games do not restrict to a compact metric space of player types, but do
employ the idea of a ¯nite number of approximate types.
Let (N;V ) be a game and let ± ¸ 0 be a non-negative real number. A ±-substitute
partition is a partition of the player set N into subsets with the property that any
two players in the same subset are \within ±" of being substitutes for each other.
Formally, given a set W ½ RN and a permutation ¿ of N , let ¾¿ (W ) denote the set
formed fromW by permuting the values of the coordinates according to the associated
permutation ¿ . Given a partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; Tg of N , a permutation ¿ of N is
type ¡ preserving if, for any i 2 N; ¿ (i) belongs to the same element of the partition
fN [t]g as i. A ±-substitute partition of N is a partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; Tg of N with
the property that, for any type-preserving permutation ¿ and any coalition S,
H1
h
V (S); ¾¡1¿ (V (¿(S)))
i · ±:
Note that in general a ±-substitute partition of N is not uniquely determined.
Moreover, two games may have the same partitions but have no other relationship to
each other (in contrast to games derived from a pregame).
(±,T )- type games. The notion of a (±,T )-type game is an extension of the notion of
a game with a ¯nite number of types to a game with approximate types.
Let ± be a non-negative real number and let T be a positive integer. A game (N; V )
is a (±; T )-type game if there is a T -member ±-substitute partition fN [t] : t = 1; ::; Tg
of N . The set N [t] is interpreted as an approximate type. Players in the same element
of a ±-substitute partition are ±-substitutes. When ± = 0; they are exact substitutes.
¯¡e®ective B¡bounded groups: In all studies of approximate cores of large games,
some conditions are required to limit gains to collective activities, such as boundedness
of marginal contributions to coalitions, as in Wooders and Zame (1984) or the less
restrictive conditions of per capita boundedness and/or small group e®ectiveness, as
in Wooders (1980,1983,1994a,b), for example. Small groups are e®ective if all or
almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups bounded in size of
membership. The following notion formulates the idea of small e®ective groups in
the context of parameterized collections of games.
Informally, groups of players containing no more than B members are ¯-e®ective
if, by restricting coalitions to having fewer than B members, the loss to each player is
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no more than ¯: This is a form of \small group e®ectiveness" for arbitrary games. Let
(N;V ) be a game. Let ¯ ¸ 0 be a given non-negative real number and let B be a given
positive integer. For each group S ½ N; de¯ne a corresponding set V (S;B) ½ RN in
the following way:
V (S;B) :=
[ "X
k
V (Sk) :
n
Sk
o
is a partition of S,
¯¯¯
Sk
¯¯¯
· B
#
.
The set V (S;B) is the payo® set of the coalition S when groups are restricted to have
no more than B members. Note that, by superadditivity, V (S;B) ½ V (S) for any
S ½ N and, by construction, V (S;B) = V (S) for jSj · B. The game (N; V ) has
¯-e®ective B-bounded groups if for every group S ½ N
H1 [V (S); V (S;B)] · ¯.
When ¯ = 0, 0-e®ective B-bounded groups are called strictly e®ective B-bounded
groups.
games with limited side payments G((±; T ); (¯;B)). Let T and B be positive integers.
Let G((±; T ); (¯;B)) be the collection of all (±; T )-type games that have ¯-e®ective B-
bounded groups. Then G((±; T ); (¯;B)) is called a parameterized collection of games
with limited side payments.
Our results hold for all parameters ± and ¯ that are su±ciently small, speci¯cally,
for 2(± + ¯) < m¤; where m¤ is a positive real number used in the de¯nition of the
Hausdor® distance. In Section 4 we introduce one additional parameter to describe
subcollections of games with limited side payments.
It may not be immediately apparent how side payments are limited by the above
de¯nition. To illustrate this feature, consider a game (Nm; V m) in which any two
players can earn two dollars and side payments are unrestricted. Suppose there are
2m players in the game. Thus the total payo® to the grand coalition is 2m dollars.
Although at ¯rst glance it may seem that this game has ¯-e®ective 2-bounded groups,
it does not. Moreover, given any ¯ ¸ 0 and any positive integer B; for su±ciently
large m the game (Nm; V m) has no ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups. To make this
clear, consider a payo® x that gives 2m dollars to one selected player and nothing to
the others. The payo® x is feasible in the game, that is x 2 V (N): But for 2m > B,
x =2 V (N ;B), de¯ned above. Moreover, for large m, the Hausdor® distance H1 from
x to V (N ;B) is large.: Thus, the form of ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups used in the
current paper rules out games with side payments.6 In fact, similar examples will
show that q-comprehensiveness of payo® sets for all coalitions with q > 0 are ruled
out by the de¯nition of ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups introduced in this paper. This
motivates our use of the term \limited side payments."
6The notion of small group e®ectiveness used in our prior papers permitted games with side
payments.
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3 Non-emptiness of equal-treatment "-cores of games
with limited side payments.
the core and epsilon cores. Let (N; V ) be a game. A payo® x is "-undominated if
for all S ½ N and y 2 V (S) it is not the case that yS >> xS + ~1S". The payo®
x is feasible if x 2 V (N). The "-core of a game (N; V ) consists of all feasible and
"-undominated allocations. When " = 0, the "-core is the core.
the equal treatment epsilon core. Given non-negative real numbers " and ±, we will
de¯ne the equal treatment "-core of a game (N;V ) relative to a partition fN [t]g of
the player set into ±-substitutes as the set of payo®s x in the "-core with the property
that for each t and all i and j in N [t], it holds that xi = xj. Thus, a payo® for a
game is in the equal-treatment "-core if all players of the same approximate type are
assigned equal payo®s.
3.1 The Theorem.
Some additional restrictions are required to obtain non-emptiness of epsilon cores of
large games with limited side payments. We will discuss the indispensability of these
conditions in the next subsection.
per capita boundedness. Let C be a positive real number. A game (N;V ) has a per
capita payo® bound of C if, for all coalitions S ½ N ,X
a2S
xa · C jSj for any x 2 V (S).
thickness. Let ½ be a positive real number, 0 < ½ · 1. A (±; T )-type game (N; V ) is
½-thick if for each t it holds that jN [t]j ¸ ½ jN j.
Our ¯rst Theorem demonstrates that, with convexity of payo® sets of grand coali-
tions, all su±ciently large games in a parameterized collection have non-empty equal-
treatment "-cores. The size of a game required to ensure non-emptiness of the equal-
treatment "-core depends on the parameters describing the games, a bound on feasible
per capita payo®s, and a bound on the thickness (the percentage of players of each
approximate type) of the player set.
Theorem 1. Let T and B be positive integers. Let C and ½ be positive real numbers,
0 < ½ · 1. Then for any " > 0 exists an integer ´("; T;B;C; ½) such that if
(a) (N; V ) 2 G((±; T ); (¯;B)),
(b) V (N) is convex,
(c) (N;V ) is ½-thick,
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(d) (N;V ) has a per capita payo® bound of C, and
(e) jN j ¸ ´("; T;B; C; ½)
then the equal treatment ("+ ± + ¯)-core of (N;V ) is nonempty.
The proof of the Theorem uses the following de¯nition of the "-remainder core
and another nonemptiness result. Informally the "-remainder core allows some small
proportion of agents to be ignored. A payo® is in the "-remainder core if it is feasible
and if it is in the core of a subgame whose player set contains all the remaining
players. The "-remainder core is de¯ned as follows.
the "-remainder core. Let (N; V ) be a game. A payo® x belongs to the "-remainder
core if, for some group S ½ N , jN j¡jSjjN j · " and xS belongs to the core of the subgame
(S; V ):
non-emptiness of the "-remainder core. (Kovalenkov and Wooders 1999, Theorem 1
(subcase for q = 0)). Let T and B be positive integers. For any " > 0; there exists
an integer ´1("; T;B) such that if
(a) (N; V ) 2 G((0; T ); (0; B)) and
(b) jN j ¸ ´1("; T; B)
then the "-remainder core of (N;V ) is non-empty.
A sketch of the proof: In the proof of Theorem 1 we ¯rst approximate a game
(N;V ) with T approximate types and ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups by another game
(N;V 0) with T exact player types and strictly e®ective B-bounded groups, that is,
by a game (N; V 0) 2 G((0; T ); (0; B)): Then we use the above result on nonemptiness
of the "-remainder core to obtain non-emptiness of the "-remainder core of (N;V 0).
This result implies that there is a core payo® in a large subgame (S; V ) and that the
proportion of \leftover" players is bounded by ". Then using per capita boundedness
and thickness of the player set, we can \smooth" payo®s in the "-remainder core
across players of the same approximate types and thus compensate leftovers. The
convexity assumption allows us to obtain equal treatment by averaging the payo®s
across players of the same type while maintaining feasibility. We present the formal
proof of Theorem 1 in the special section.
In the next subsection we present examples clarifying Theorem 1.
3.2 Examples.
Our ¯rst example illustrates the statement of Theorem 1.
Example 1: Let (N; V0) be a superadditive game where, for any two-person coali-
tion S = fi; jg; j 6= i;
V0(S) := fx 2 RN : xi · 1; xj · 1; and xk = 0 for k 6= i; jg
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and for each i 2 N ,
V0(fig) := fx 2 RN : xi · 0 and xj = 0 for all j 6= ig:
For an arbitrary coalition S the payo® set V0(S) is given as the superadditive
cover, that is,
V0(S) :=
[
P(S)
X
S02P(S)
V0(S 0);
where the union is taken over all partitions P(S) of S:
We now de¯ne a game (N; Vco) in the following way. For each S ½ N , let
Vco(S) denote the convex cover of the payo® set V0(S), that is
Vco(S) := co(V0(S)):
Obviously the game (N;Vco) has convex payo® sets, one player type, and per
capita bound of 1. We leave it to the reader to verify that for any positive
integer m ¸ 3 the game (N;Vco) has 1m -e®ective m-bounded groups. Thus the
game (N;Vco) is a member of the class G((0; 1); ( 1m ;m)) and is 1-thick. Then,
by Theorem 1, for jN j ¸ ´("; 1;m; 1; 1) the equal treatment (" + 1m)-core of
(N;Vco) is nonempty.
Therefore for any "0 > 0 there is a positive integer N("0) such that for any
jN j ¸ N("0) the game (N;Vco) has a non-empty equal treatment "0-core. (For
example take an integer m0 ¸ 2"0 and de¯ne N("0) ¸ ´("02 ; 1;m0; 1; 1):)
The next two examples illustrates that neither convexity of V (N) nor thickness
of the game can be omitted in the statement of Theorem 1.
Example 2. Convexity of V (N): Consider a sequence of games without side pay-
ments (Nm; V m)1m=1 where the mth game has 2m+1 players. Suppose that any
player alone can earn at most 0 units. Suppose that any two-player coalition
can distribute a total payo® of 2 units in any agreed-upon way, while there is no
transferability of payo® between coalitions. Suppose only one- and two-player
coalitions are e®ective. Then the game is described by the following parameters:
T = 1; ½ = 1; B = 2; ± = ¯ = 0 and has per capita bound C = 1: Thus the
game satis¯es all the assumptions of Theorem 1 except convexity of V (N). The
1
3 -core of the game, however, is empty for arbitrarily large values of m: (At any
feasible payo®, at least one player gets 0 units and some other player no more
than 1 unit. These two players can form a coalition and receive 2 units in total.
This coalition can improve upon the given payo® for each of its members by 12 .)
Example 3. Thickness. Consider a sequence of games without side payments
(Nm; V m)1m=1 where the mth game has m + 3 players. Suppose that there are
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two types of players. Let the mth game have 3 players of type A and m players
of type B. Assume that only players of the type A are essential in the following
sense: Any coalition with less than two players of type A can get only 0 units
or less for each of its players. Suppose that any coalition with two or three
players of type A can get only 2 units to be distributed between players of
type A in the coalition and 0 units or less for each of its players of type B.
Note that there is no transferability of payo® from the players of type B to
the players of type A. Then the game is described by the following parameters:
T = 2; B = 3; ± = ¯ = 0; C = 1: Moreover, V m(N) is convex: The 17-core of
the game, however, is empty for arbitrarily large values of m: (For any feasible
payo® there is a player of type A who receives no more than 23 units. There is
another player of type A that gets no more than 1 unit. These 2 players can
form a coalition and receive 2 units in total. This coalition can improve upon
the given payo® for each of its members by 16 ; since (2 ¡ 53)12 = 16 .)
Remark. Per capita boundedness and small group e®ectiveness. Recall that for large
games with side payments derived from pregames, Wooders (1994b) establishes an
equivalence between small group e®ectiveness and per capita boundedness.7 Within
the framework of parametrized collections of games, this equivalence no longer holds.
This raises the question of whether either one or the other of the conditions can
be dropped. Example A1, in an appendix, shows that the condition of small group
e®ectiveness cannot be disregarded. The necessity of the assumption of per capita
boundedness is not clear. Example A2 in the appendix illustrates that per capita
boundedness is not a consequence of the other conditions in Theorem 1 but we have
no example showing per capita boundedness is indispensible. Note, however, that per
capita boundedness is a very mild assumption satis¯ed by most economic examples.
4 The equal treatment property of "-cores of games
with limited side payments.
In the previous Section we presented results on non-emptiness of the "-cores for large
games with limited side payments. In fact, Theorem 1 shows non-emptiness of the
equal-treatment "-core as well. In the current Section we focus on games where
some degree of side payments is required for small groups. Speci¯cally, we require
q-comprehensiveness for nearly-e®ective groups. We then demonstrate that under
this condition, the "-core of a game with limited side payments is equal-treatment in
a very strong sense: any payo® in this "-core treats all players that are approximate
substitutes nearly equally.
7The games must be large in the sense that any player that appears in the game must have many
close substitutes.
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4.1 The Theorem.
Consider a set W ½ RS. Recall that W is comprehensive if x 2W and y · x implies
y 2 W . The set W is strongly comprehensive if it is comprehensive, and whenever
x 2W; y 2W; and x < y there exists z 2W such that x << z:8
Our second Theorem requires a uniform version of strong comprehensiveness.
Given x 2 RS, i; j 2 S, 0 · q · 1 and " ¸ 0; de¯ne a vector xqi;j(") 2 RS;
by
(xqi;j("))i = xi ¡ ";
(xqi;j("))j = xj + q"; and
(xqi;j("))k = xk for k 2 Sn fi; jg :
The set W is q-comprehensive if W is comprehensive and if, for any x 2 W , it holds
that (xqi;j(")) 2W for any i; j 2 S and any " ¸ 0.
This condition for q > 0 bounds the slope of the Pareto frontier of the set away
from zero. For q equal to one, q-comprehensiveness is equivalent to the assumption
of transferable utility. For q equal to zero, q-comprehensiveness means simply com-
prehensiveness. Note that if a set is q-comprehensive for some q > 0 then the set is
q0-comprehensive for all q0 with q ¸ q0 ¸ 0:
games with side payments limited to nearly-e®ective groups G((±; T ); (¯;B; q)). Let
G((±; T ); (¯;B)) be a parameterized collection games with limited side payments that
was de¯ned in Section 2. Let 0 · q · 1 be given. Let G((±; T ); (¯;B; q)) denote
the subcollection of games in G((±; T ); (¯;B)) with the property that if (N; V ) is a
member of the subcollection then for all S ½ N with jSj · B; VS is q-comprehensive.
Note that
G((±; T ); (¯;B; q)) ½ G((±; T ); (¯;B; q0)) ½ G((±; T ); (¯;B; 0) = G((±; T ); (¯;B))
for all q and q0 such that q ¸ q0 ¸ 0. When q > 0 will call this collection of games,
games with side payments limited to nearly-e®ective groups.
Our main Theorem requires some degree of side-paymentness for small coalitions
{ those coalitions containing no more members than the given bound on nearly e®ec-
tive coalition sizes. Payo® sets for nearly-e®ective coalitions are required to satisfy
q-comprehensiveness for some q > 0; that is, side payments can be made between
players in nearly e®ective coalitions at a rate bounded below by q. For large coali-
tions, however, q can be arbitrarily small or zero. The Theorem demonstrates that
if a game with limited side payments has su±ciently many players of any particular
8Informally, if one person can be made better o® (while all the others remain at least as well
o®), then all persons can be made better o®. This assumption, called \quasi-transferable utility" in
Wooders (1983) has also been called \nonleveledness."
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approximate type, then all payo®s in the "-core treat all members of that type nearly
equally { that is, any two players of such an approximate type receive approximately
the same "-core payo®s. The distance between "-core payo®s of any of the two play-
ers is bounded above by a function of the parameters describing the game. From
inspection of the bound, we can conclude that as approximate types become close to
exact types, nearly e®ective groups become strictly e®ective and " goes to zero, the
"-core \shrinks" to the equal-treatment "-core.
Theorem 2. Let (N; V ) 2 G((±; T ); (¯;B; q)) where q > 0 and let fN [t]g be a
partition of N into ±-substitutes. If some payo® x belongs to the "-core of (N; V )
and for some t it holds that jN [t]j > B, then for any t1; t2 2 N [t],
jxt1 ¡ xt2 j · 2Bq ("+ ± + ¯):
The above theorem implies that, as "; ± and ¯ \became small," providing there
are more than B players of each type, the "-core \shrinks" to the equal treatment
" -core. It is important to bear in mind in interpreting the theorem that for large
groups, q-comprehensiveness is not assumed. As noted previously, we have in mind
situations such as economies with many small clubs or marriages, for example, where
transfers may be made within the group, but large transfers, which would require the
cooperation of large groups of players, are ruled out.
We present the proof of Theorem 2 in the special section. In the next subsection
we present examples clarifying Theorem 2.
4.2 Examples.
The following simple example illustrates the statement of Theorem 2 and also shows
that, in the central case of ± = ¯ = 0; the bound provided can not be improved upon.
Example 4: Let (N;V ¤) be a superadditive game where for any two-person coali-
tion S = fi; jg; j 6= i;
V ¤(S) := fx 2 RN : xi + xj · 2; and xk = 0 for k 6= i; jg
and for each i 2 N , let
V ¤(fig) := fx 2 RN : xi · 0 and xj = 0 for all j 6= ig:
For an arbitrary coalition S the payo® set V ¤(S) is given as the superadditive
cover, that is,
V ¤(S) :=
[
P(S)
X
S02P(S)
V ¤(S 0);
where the union is taken over all partitions P(S) of S:
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Observe that the game (N;V ¤) has one exact player type and strictly e®ective
2-bounded groups. Therefore (N;V ¤) 2 G((0; 1); (0; 2)): Moreover V ¤S is 1-
comprehensive for any S ½ N , jSj · 2. Let the game (N; V ¤) have an even
number of players, that is jN j = 2m for some positive integer m. Observe that
the payo® which gives one unit for each player belongs to the core of (N;V ¤).
Thus, for any " ¸ 0; the "-core of (N; V ¤) is non-empty. Theorem 2 implies
that for any a; b 2 N and any payo® x in the "-core of (N;V ¤), providing that
jN j > 2; we must have
jxa ¡ xbj · 4":
It is easy to check that this statement can not be improved. Observe ¯rst that
the restriction jN j > 2 is essential. If jN j = 2 then any division of two units
between two players is a core payo®; thus, for " < 12 the bound of the Theorem
is not applicable. Now consider a payo® y that gives 1 unit to each of the players
except two selected players (say players a and b), 1¡ 2" to player a, and 1+ 2"
to player b. The reader can observe that even in the case jN j > 2 this payo®
is in the "-core of the game (N;V ¤). (The payo® is obviously feasible, but it
is also "-undominated, since any pair of players get at y at least 2 ¡ 2".) But
at this payo® it holds that jya ¡ ybj = 4". Thus the bound given in Theorem 2
cannot be improved.
It is well known that a Theorem such as the above will not hold for games with
side payments. The following example provides an illustration.
Example 5a: Fix any " > 0: Consider a game with side payments (N; v) that has
one exact player type and a nonempty equal-treatment core. (There are many
such games.) Take any payo® x 2 RN in the equal-treatment core of (N; v).
This determines a number x as the payo® for each player in N: Now select one
player (say player a). Consider the payo® y that assigns x ¡ " for all players
except player a and x+(jN j¡1)" to player a. Obviously the payo® y is feasible
and "-undominated. Thus y belongs to the "-core of (N; v): However for a very
large jN j ; y treats player a much better than others.
The sharpest result that can be obtained for games with side payments induced by
pregames satisfying per capita boundedness (or even strict small group e®ectiveness)
is that for small values of ", most players of the same type are treated approxi-
mately equally (Wooders 1980,1994a). For games without side payments that have
q-comprehensive payo® sets for q > 0 (q-sidepayments) it also does not hold that
the "-core treats all players of the same type approximately equally. The following
example, quite similar to the previous one, demonstrates this point.
Example 5b: Fix any " > 0, q > 0: Consider a game (N; V ) with q-comprehensive
payo® sets, one exact player type and a nonempty equal-treatment core. (As
14
above, there are many such games.) Take any payo® in the equal-treatment
core of (N; V ) and de¯ne x as the payo® assigned to each player in N: Now
select one player, say a. Consider the payo® yq that assigns x¡ " for all players
except player a and x+ q(jN j¡1)" for a player a. Then the payo® yq is feasible
and "-undominated. Thus yq belongs to the "-core of (N;V ): For very large
jN j, however, yq treats one player much better than the others.
The above examples show that Theorem 2 depends crucially on the fact that
side payments are limited. The other condition of Theorem 2, q-comprehensiveness
(q > 0) for payo® sets of small coalitions, is also crucial for equal-treatment property
of the "-core. Example 6 below, which continues Example 1, shows that without this
restriction the "-core may contain non-equal-treatment payo®s, even for games with
limited side payments.
Example 6: Recall the game (N;V0) de¯ned in Example 1. Observe that the game
(N;V0) has one exact player type, strictly e®ective 2-bounded groups, and a per
capita bound of 1. Thus, (N; V0) 2 G((0; 1); (0; 2)): But, for any q > 0 and any
coalition S of two players; the payo® sets V (S) are not q-comprehensive. Let
m be a positive integer. Let (Nm; V m0 ) be a game where the number of players
in the set Nm is 2m+ 1 and for any coalition S ½ Nm V m0 (S) := V0(S). Thus,
each game (Nm; V m0 ) has an odd number of players.
It is easy to see that the payo® y giving 1 to each of 2m players and 0 to the
last player (say player a) is in the core. (The \left-out" player, in a coalition
by himself, cannot make both himself and a player in a two-person coalition
better o® { the player in the two-person coalition cannot be given more than
1.) However for any player other than a; say for player b; we have yb = 1. Thus
jya ¡ ybj = 1; even though all players are exact substitutes and ± = ¯ = 0 but
the core does not converge to the equal-treatment core, even for an arbitrarily
large m:
5 Remarks.
Remark 1. Relationships to other papers using parameterized collections of games.
Our prior results for the "-core depended on a notion of q-comprehensiveness. In
fact, all our previous results require that payo® sets be q-comprehensive with q > 0;
the case q = 0 has not been treated. The main goal of the current paper is to treat
the case where q > 0 only for small coalitions, thus allowing transfers within small
e®ective coalitions but ruling out arbitrarily large transfers.
Remark 2. Small group e®ectiveness for improvement. There are several possibili-
ties for de¯ning ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups. Our de¯nition requires that partitions
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of the total player set into B-bounded groups can realize almost all payo®s in V (N):
This approach has the advantage of ease of exposition. Another possibility is to re-
quire that all improvement can be carried out by groups bounded in size.
¯-improvement-e®ective B-bounded groups. Let us say that a payo® x can be ¯-
improved upon by some coalition S in a game (N; V ) if there is a payo® y 2 V (S)
such that yS >> xS ¡ ¯~1S: Suppose that a game (N;V ) satis¯es the property that
for each payo® x 2 V (N), if x can be ¯2 -improved by some coalition then there is
a coalition S satisfying jSj · B that can ¯-improve upon x. Then (N; V ) has ¯-
improvement-e®ective B-bounded groups.
The condition that a game has bounded group sizes that are e®ective for improvement
is obviously less restrictive than the condition de¯ned earlier of ¯-e®ective B-bounded
groups. The conditions are, however, interchangeable.9 The only di®erence in our
results, were we to use ¯-e®ectiveness for improvement, would be that the bounds
change. Our motivation in choosing the condition of ¯-e®ective B-bounded groups
is that the condition is more easily veri¯able since it only depends on what groups
of individuals can do rather than on the entire game structure and it seems more
consistent with the sort of examples most frequently used in the literature.10
Remark 3. E®ectiveness of relatively small groups. It may be possible to obtain
analogues of the results of this paper for situations where bounds are placed on
relative sizes of e®ective coalitions rather than absolute sizes. We've chosen to bound
the absolute sizes of near-e®ective coalitions since familiar examples of games and
economies have natural bounds on absolute sizes of e®ective coalitions, for example,
marriage models.
6 Economies with limited side payments.
In application, the conditions of our results may not be unduly restrictive. Indeed,
in some game theoretic and economic situations, limited side payments would appear
to be natural, for example, in job matching models (Kelso and Crawford (1982),
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and others). Even if side payments were possible, in
large games it may require cooperation and agreement between a large number of
9See Wooders (1994a, Proposition 3.8) for the relationship between these two notions of ef-
fectiveness in the context of games derived from pregames. In other contexts, an example of the
interchangeability of these conditions is given by Mas-Colell (1979) and Kaneko and Wooders (1989).
Mas-Colell uses the fact that almost all improvement in exchange economies can be carried out by
groups bounded in size while Kaneko and Wooders use the fact that almost all feasible outcomes
can be achieved by partitions of the total player set into groups bounded in size.
10For example: marriages involve two persons; softball teams have nine members; and when
average costs of production are downward sloping and bounded away from zero, there is some size
of plant that is \almost e±cient."
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players to make large transfers. In this case the framework of side payments, or
even q-comprehensiveness for q > 0, may be quite problematic. On the other hand,
the presumption of economics that there exists opportunities for gains to trade and
exchange is at the heart of economics. Thus, the requirement of some degree of side
paymentness within small coalitions may not be restrictive.
There are also speci¯c examples to which our results apply. Consider a two-sided
matching model where all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups
consisting of one person from each side of the market and where utility is transferable
within buyer-seller pairs. If there is some mechanism convexifying the total payo® set
(for example, lotteries), then both our nonemptiness result and our equal-treatment
result apply. These remarks also apply to partitioning games.11
Another class of economic models whose derived games may well ¯t into our
assumptions include economies with local public goods or clubs. (A survey is pro-
vided in Conley and Wooders 1998). Kovalenkov and Wooders (1999) introduce a
model of an economy with clubs (and multiple memberships) and, under remarkably
nonrestrictive conditions, demonstrate nonemptiness of approximate cores. With ap-
propriate conditions on the economic models, the results of the current paper could
be applied to models of economies with clubs.
7 Proofs.
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall that we required 2(¯+ ±) < m¤. Assume for now that
" · minnm¤2 ; BCo, implying that ("+ ¯+ ±) < m¤. We ¯rst consider the case where
the game (N;V ) has strongly comprehensive payo® sets and then use the result for
this case to obtain the result for the general case.
Case 1. Suppose the game (N; V ) has strongly comprehensive payo® sets. De¯ne
for each S ½ N
V 0(S) :=
\
¾¡1¿ (V (¿ (S)));
where intersection is taken over all type-consistent permutations ¿ . Then (N;V 0) 2
G((0; T ); (¯;B)) and V 0(N) is convex. Moreover, V 0(S) ½ V (S) and
H1(V 0(S); V (S)) · ±
for any S ½ N . Now let us de¯ne for any S ½ N
V 0(S) := V 0(S;B):
Then (N; V 0) 2 G((0; T ); (0; B)). Moreover,
V 0(S) ½ V 0(S) ½ V (S)
11See Garratt and Qin (1997) for examples of games with lotteries, Kaneko (1982) for NTU
assignment markets and Kaneko and Wooders (1982) and le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) for
partitioning games.
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and
H1(V 0(S); V (S)) · H1(V 0(S); V 0(S)) +H1(V 0(S); V (S)) · ¯ + ±:
In addition, the game (N; V 0) has a per capita payo® bound of C and strongly
comprehensive payo® sets.
Applying Kovalenkov and Wooders (1999, Theorem 1) for the "0-remainder core,
with
"0 :=
½
BC
";
to the game (N; V 0) it follows that for jN j ¸ ´1("0; T; B) there is some coalition S
such that the subgame (S; V 0) has a non-empty core and jSjjN j ¸ 1 ¡ "0: Let x be a
payo® in the core of the subgame (S; V 0). Note that ½ > "0:
We now prove that for jN j ¸ (B+1)½¡"0 the payo® x will have the equal treatment
property, that is, for every t and any i; j 2 N [t] ; xi = xj: Suppose there is a type
t and two players i1; i2 2 N [t] \ S satisfying xi1 > xi2 : By feasibility of x; there is
some partition
n
Sk
o
of S;
¯¯¯
Sk
¯¯¯
· B for each k, such that x 2 Pk V 0(Sk): Then,
since jN j ¸ (B+1)½¡"0 we have that jN [t] \ Sj ¸ ½ jN j ¡ "0 jN j > B and there must
exist j1; j2 2 N [t] \ S such that xj1 2 Sk1 ; xj2 2 Sk2 for Sk1; Sk2 ½
n
Sk
o
; Sk1 6= Sk2
and xj1 > xj2 : (If xi1 ; xi2 are in the same element of
n
Sk
o
, there exists j 2 N [t]TS
in the di®erent element of
n
Sk
o
than i1; i2 and it can't be xj = xi1 and xj = xi2
since xi1 6= xi2 . Thus we can suppose without loss of generality that j1 and j2 are in
di®erent elements in
n
Sk
o
:) But then the agents of Sk1nfj1g can form the coalition
Sk1nfj2gwith player j2 rather then j1: By strong comprehensiveness of payo® sets and
since players j1; j2 are exact substitutes in the game (S; V 0); all players in the new
coalition can be strictly better o® than in x: This contradicts the supposition that x
is a core payo® for the game (S; V 0): Thus x has the equal treatment property.
Now let ´0("; T;B; C; ½) := max
n
´1("0; T;B); (B+1)½¡"0
o
; where, as above, "0 = ½BC ".
As we shown, for jN j ¸ ´0("; T; B; C; ½) there is a coalition S ½ N satisfying jSjjN j ¸
1 ¡ "0 and, for each t, jS TN [t]j > B and there is a payo® x 2 RS in the equal
treatment core of (S; V 0).
Next, de¯ne a payo® z 2 RN that, for each t, assigns to each a 2 N [t] the
same payo® assigned to players of type t by x. This payo® z is undominated in the
game (N;V 0): (If payo® z were dominated by some coalition S1 in (N; V 0) then z
could be dominated by some coalition S2 ½ S1; jS2j · B: But there exists a coalition
S3 ½ S with the same pro¯le as S2: This coalition S3 dominates the payo® x in
(S; V 0) contradicting to the fact that x is in the core of (S; V 0).) Moreover, since
x 2 Pk V 0(Sk) for some partition nSko of S with ¯¯¯Sk ¯¯¯ · B; by per capita boundedness
xa · BC for any a 2 S: Thus za · BC for any a 2 S:
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Now construct a payo® x0 2 RN from the payo® for x 2 RS by
x0S := xS and x
0
a := 0 for all a =2 S.
Let y 2 RN be the average of all payo®s ¾¿ (x0) across all type-consistent permutations
¿ of N . Then y has an equal treatment property. Moreover, for every t and any
a 2 N [t]
za ¡ ya = za ¡ jN [t]
T
Sj
jN [t]j za ·
jN [t]j ¡ jN [t]TSj
jN [t]j za
· jN j ¡ jSjjN [t]j za ·
"0
½
za · "
0
½
BC = ":
Since z is undominated in (N; V 0); y is "-undominated in (N; V 0). Therefore for
jN j ¸ ´0("; T;B;C; ½) the payo® y has equal treatment property and is (" + ¯ + ±)-
undominated in the original game (N; V ). In addition, observe that x0 2 V 0(N) ½
V 0(N): Therefore ¾¿ (x0) 2 V 0(N) for any type-consistent permutation ¿ of N . By
convexity of V 0(N) and by construction of y; it holds that y 2 V 0(N) ½ V (N): Thus,
for jN j ¸ ´0("; T; B; C; ½) the payo® y belongs to the equal treatment ("+¯+ ±)-core
of (N;V ).
Case 2. Now we consider the general case, where the game (N;V ) does not neces-
sarily have strongly comprehensive payo® sets. We ¯rst approximate the game (N; V )
by another game (N; V 0) with strongly comprehensive payo® sets. This approxima-
tion can be done su±ciently closely, so that V (S) ½ V 0(S) and H1(V (S); V 0(S)) · "2
for any S ½ N . Note that the approximation is easy since, by our de¯nition of
the Hausdor® distance, we must ensure close approximation only on a compact
set. (For details of such an approximation see Wooders (1983), Appendix.) Let
´("; T; B;C; ½) := ´0( "2 ; T; B;C; ½). By Case 1 above, for jN j ¸ ´("; T;B; C; ½) the
equal treatment ( "2 + ¯ + ±)-core of the game (N; V
0) is nonempty. But then for
jN j ¸ ´("; T;B; C; ½) the game (N; V ) has a non-empty equal treatment ("+ ¯ + ±)-
core. This is the conclusion we need for " · minnm¤2 ; BCo.
Finally for " > min
n
m¤
2 ; BC
o
consider "0 := min
n
m¤
2 ; BC
o
and let ´("; T; B;C; ½) :=
´("0; T; B; C; ½). Since " ¸ "0; for jN j ¸ ´("; T; B; C; ½) again the equal treatment
("+ ¯ + ±)-core of the game (N; V ) is nonempty.
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider some payo® vector x in the "-core of (N; V ). De¯ne
a payo® vector y by y(fig) := x(fig)¡¯ for each i 2 N . Since (N; V ) has ¯-e®ective
B-bounded groups, there exists a partition
n
Sk
o
of N , with
¯¯¯
Sk
¯¯¯
· B for each k,
such that y 2 Pk V (Sk). Moreover, for the game (N;V ); by construction the payo®
y cannot be improved upon by any coalition S ½ N for each of it's member by more
than ("+ ¯).
19
Case 1. Consider the case, where according to the partition
n
Sk
o
; two players t1
and t2 of the same approximate type (that is, t1; t2 2 N [t]) are in di®erent coalitions.
Suppose t1 2 S1 and t2 2 S2. Suppose also that yt1 > yt2. Then agents in S1nft1g
would prefer to form a new coalition with t2 rather then t1. Let S = S1nft1g. Let ¿
denote a permutation of N that permutes only t1 and t2: Since players t1 and t2 are
of the same approximate type, ¿ is a type-consistent permutation and
H1
h
V (S1); ¾¿ (V (S [ ft2g)
i · ±:
Hence there exists a payo® z that is feasible for S
S ft2g and close to the payo® y
with the loss for any agent in S
S ft2g of not more then ±. Since transfers at rate q
are possible, this new coalition can improve upon the payo® vector y by more than
("+ ¯) for each player if
q(jyt1 ¡ yt2 j ¡ ("+ ¯) ¡ ±) > jSj ± + jSj ("+ ¯):
Since y is an (" + ¯)-core payo® we must have: jyt1 ¡ yt2 j ¡ (" + ± + ¯) · 1q jSj (" +
± + ¯) · 1q (B ¡ 1)("+ ± + ¯): Hence, jxt1 ¡ xt2 j = jyt1 ¡ yt2j · Bq ("+ ± + ¯).
Case 2. Now suppose that t1 and t2 are in the same element of the partition
fSkg. Then, since jN [t]j > B; there exists t3 2 N [t] that belongs to a di®erent
member of the partition fSkg. Hence by Case 1 above: jxt1 ¡ xt2 j · jxt1 ¡ xt3j+jxt3 ¡ xt2j · 2Bq ("+ ± + ¯).
8 Appendix: Additional examples.
In this Section we present two examples that were discussed in Section 3. Both
illustrates the importance of the conditions in Theorem 1. Example A1 appeared
previously in Kovalenkov and Wooders (1999, Example 4).
Example A1: The indispensability of the small group e®ectiveness assumption.
Consider a sequence of games (Nm; vm)1m=1 with side payments and where the
mth game has 3m players. Suppose that any coalition S consisting of at least
2m players can get up to 2m units of payo® to divide among its members, that
is, vm(S) = 2m. Assume that if jSj < 2m; then vm(S) = 0. Observe that
each game has one exact player type and a per capita bound of 1. That is,
½ = 1; T = 1; C = 1; and ± = 0: However, the 17 -core of the game is empty for
arbitrarily large values of m:
For any feasible payo® there are m players that are assigned in total no more
than 2m3mm =
2
3m: There are another m players that are assigned in total no
more than 2m2mm = m: These 2m players can form a coalition and receive 2m in
total. This coalition can improve upon the given payo® for each of its members
by 16 ; since (2m¡ 53m) 12m = 16 :
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Example A2: The independence of the per capita boundedness assumption. Let m
be an arbitrary positive integer. Let (N; V m) be a superadditive game where,
for any coalition S; with jSj > 1;
V m(S) := fx 2 RN : xi · m for i 2 S; and xk = 0 for k =2 Sg
and for each i 2 N ,
V m(fig) := fx 2 RN : xi · 0 and xj = 0 for all j 6= ig:
Now let us de¯ne a collection of games
G¤ := f(N; V m) : m 2 Z+g :
Obviously any game (N;V ) 2 G¤ has convex payo® sets and non-empty core.
Moreover, any game (N;V ) 2 G¤ has one (exact) player type and thus is 1-
thick. We leave it to the reader to verify that any game (N; V ) 2 G¤ has strictly
e®ective 3-bounded groups. Thus, G¤ ½ G((0; 1); (0; 3)) and all games in G¤
are 1-thick, have convex payo® sets and non-empty cores.
However the class G¤ is not restricted by any common per capita boundedness
condition. For any positive integer C and any m > C the game (N; V m) 2 G¤
does not satisfy per capita bound of C. Hence the condition of the common per
capita bound on the collection of games is independent of all other conditions
(and the implication) in Theorem 1.
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